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SUMMARY
Commodity trade is central to the global economy but is also associated with socio-environmental impacts,
for example, deforestation, especially in producer countries. It is crucial to understand how geographic
sourcing patterns of commodities and commercial relationships between places and actors influence
land-use dynamics, socio-economic development, and environmental degradation. Here, we propose a
concept and methodological approach to analyze the geographic stickiness of commodity supply chains,
which is the maintenance of supply network configurations over time and across perturbations. We show-
case policy-relevant metrics for all Brazilian soy exports between 2003 and 2017, using high-resolution sup-
ply chain data from www.trase.earth. We find that the Brazilian soy traders with the largest market share
exhibit stickier geographic sourcing patterns, and that the supply network configurations between produc-
tion places and traders become increasingly sticky in subsequent years. Understanding trade stickiness is
crucial for supply chain accountability, because it directly affects the effectiveness of zero-deforestation
commitments.
INTRODUCTION
Over recent decades, the growth in agricultural trade has pro-
moted economic development and food security but also
resulted in negative socio-economic and environmental im-
pacts.1–4 Trade and consumption of agricultural commodities
are critical drivers of land-use change, deforestation, biodiversity
loss,5,6 and carbon emissions.7,8
The production of internationally traded and financed com-
modities, such as soy (see Supplemental Experimental
SCIENCE FOR SOCIETY Consumption of food in locations far from production is a cause of forest loss,
especially in developing countries that lack the resources, capacity, or political will to distinguish legal
from illegal deforestation. In response, civil society and consumers have pushed companies to make
zero-deforestation commitments. For these commitments to be effective, supply chain transparency is
crucial, but stickiness also plays a key role. Stickiness refers to stable and consistent commercial relation-
ships between companies and regions. Stickiness may influence how companies attain zero-deforestation
commitments.
For instance, companies with non-sticky sourcing patterns may move geographically, not committing to
achieving long-term sustainability. Here, we look at the soy trade in Brazil, the world’s largest exporter, to
analyze supply chain stickiness and explain why it is essential to curb deforestation. We show that stickiness
is associated with deforestation risk.
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Procedures, The Soy Supply Chain in Brazil), beef, and palm oil,
dominates land use in many agricultural regions. It is responsible
for over 27% of recent global forest loss.6 Supply chain actors,
such as food processors, slaughterhouses, traders, and re-
tailers, including countries that purchase these commodities,
play a crucial role in shaping land-use dynamics by influencing
demand, investments in infrastructure, financing, and govern-
ment decisions.9–11
An increasing number of governance interventions target
these supply chain actors, including pushes for zero-deforesta-
tion commitments (ZDC). ZDCs aim to zero the deforestation
driven by commodity supply chains, such as palm oil, beef, or
soy. There are ZDCs signed by individual companies, but also
by multi-stakeholder coalitions, including national and subna-
tional governments and non-government organizations
(NGOs), where each stakeholder assumes a specific role. For
example, companies implement ZDCs, NGOs monitor compli-
ance, and governments provide the tools. Examples of ZDCs
can be in the form of sustainability roundtables (e.g., Roundtable
on Sustainable Palm Oil), and broader governance fora (e.g.,
Tropical Forests Alliance).12
The Amazon Soy Moratorium (ASM), another ZDC example,
was the first voluntary ZDC in the tropics. It was a response
from soy traders to pressure from retailers and NGOs, resulting
in the agreement to not purchase soy from areas deforested after
July 2006 in the Brazilian Amazon. The ASM is reputed to have
reduced direct deforestation to soy fields from 30% to 1% of
annual soy expansion in the Brazilian Amazon.13 ZDCs, com-
bined with public policies, are crucial to address deforestation,
as commodity supply chains drive about 5million hectares of for-
est loss every year.6
ZDCs result from consumer demand and NGO pres-
sure,12,14,15 but also from corporate recognition that sustainabil-
ity commitments may increase both supply chain control and
reputation.16 The accountability and engagement of supply
chain upstream actors are thus critical for these initiatives to
be successful and deliver the expected impacts. In agricultural
supply chains, for example, implementing ZDCs requires
the engagement between food buyers, processors, and
farmers.14,17–19 Understanding the geographic patterns of
supply chain relationships can contribute to holding corpora-
tions accountable for what happens in the production regions
to which they are linked.14,18,20
Supply chain transparency is a prerequisite for corporate
land use accountability14 and the monitoring of ZDCs,18 such
as through the accountability framework initiative (https://
accountability-framework.org/). Knowledge of how much, how,
and why supply chain actors engage with each other and with
specific sourcing regions remains limited. Moreover, we need
an improved understanding of how andwhy actors shift sourcing
locations over time and how this influences land-use dynamics
and socio-environmental outcomes.12,15,19,21
Researching the patterns of relationships between actors and
regions over time is critical to understand different development
trajectories in rural landscapes, as these trajectories are shaped
by the responses of supply chain actors to biophysical, policy,
logistic, or socio-economic shocks and changes.12,22,23 Exam-
ining the spatial-temporal connections between commodity
buyers and sourcing regions can support governance and
accountability processes by informing on the potential effective-
ness of ZDCs,12,15 and on indirect and leakage effects where
sourcing relationships are displaced in response to policy
interventions.24
Markets are not entirely integrated and exhibit some stickiness,
i.e., some trading relationships persist under changing conditions
or show inertia in responding to price and other shocks.25 This
persistence is related to various factors, such as supply chain in-
frastructures in production regions and traders’ local expertise.26
Agricultural traders that have volatile geographic sourcing pat-
terns likely have weaker connections, credibility, and engage-
ment with farmers, and thus less capacity to transmit the zero-
deforestation signal or demand to their suppliers. Volatile traders
canmove from high to low deforestation risk regions after signing
a ZDC, thereby mitigating the direct risks in their supply chains,
but failing to improve the overall outcome. Traders with more
enduring commercial relationships may have enhanced rele-
vance and impact in their actions. Trade persistence justifies
robust accountability frameworks to reduce deforestation in
specific supply chains, as it increases the likelihood that these
supply chain actions will send a strong and sustained signal to
the actors in the production landscapes.14,16–18,27,28
Nevertheless, to date, research hasmostly focusedon country-
to-country persistence of trade relations. Current research lacks
a clear conceptual model for defining the relationship between
production landscapes, commodity traders, and consuming
markets, as well as empirical measures of it, mostly because of
insufficiently detailed and subnational data on supply chains.
The objectives of this paper are to develop (1) a conceptual
framework to analyze the geographic stickiness in global com-
modity trade, conceived as a measure of the stability and rigidity
over time of supply chain configurations, i.e., of the network of
trade linkages and flows between specific regions and actors;
(2) metrics to operationalize this framework and to measure stick-
iness empirically; and (3) hypotheses on how stickiness influences
the existence and effectiveness of supply chain ZDCs, and, more
broadly, the governance of supply chains for socio-environmental
sustainability. We focus on agricultural commodities and their
relation to land use, but the notion has broader relevance for other
supply chains and sustainability issues.
Empirically, we use the first supply chain maps linking subna-
tional producing regions of Brazilian soy to global markets, iden-
tifying trading companies, between 2003 and 2017, developed
by the Trase initiative (www.trase.earth). In the international
trade of Brazilian soy, we measure the trade stickiness between
specific production and distribution places, companies engaged
in trading, and consumption countries.29 We apply temporal
network analysis to measure the similarity of the export supply
chain network over time, i.e., how stable are the commercial
relationships.
RESULTS
Conceptualizing Stickiness in Commodity Supply
Chains
We bridge theoretical and empirical approaches from three main
fields, agricultural and trade economics, global commodity
chains (GCCs) and global value chains (GVCs), and social-
ecological resilience,11,15,22,25,30–45,46–65,66–75 to propose a
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conceptualization of stickiness in global commodity supply
chains (see Designing a Conceptual Framework for Stickiness
in Experimental Procedures).
Based on this, we define stickiness in global commodity sup-
ply chains as the maintenance and recovery, over time and
through shocks, of supply chains’ geographic network configu-
rations, i.e., the network of trade linkages and flows between
specific places of production and consumption, and specific ac-
tors including producers, traders, retailers, and consumers. We
distinguish three interlinked dimensions of stickiness: (1) the
persistence of supply chain configurations over time, regardless
of the identification of any shock, and their (2) resistance to and
(3) recovery from shocks (Figure 1). These three dimensions can
be used to characterize supply chains as a whole, as well as spe-
cific actors and places in a supply chain.
The first dimension, persistence, is directly observable. In
contrast, assessing resistance and recovery requires the identi-
fication of a shock affecting supply chain relationships and an
analysis of their capacity to remain unaffected by it or to return
to their previous state. Thus, under an initial observation,
‘‘sticky’’ would correspond to ‘‘persistent.’’ A lack of persistence
likely reveals a lack of resistance. However, when analyzing the
response to specific shocks, it is possible to further qualify the
resistance or recovery to these specific shocks.
Persistence measures how much trade relations remain
similar over time—e.g., as traders consistently source products
from the same regions and sell to the same consumer markets—
or not. Persistence describes the patterns observed, absent
specific knowledge about factors (shocks, perturbations) that
could have affected the supply chain configuration.
Resistance measures the persistence of supply chain configu-
rations under specific shocks or perturbations. Perturbations may
affect certain places and supply chain actors. Perturbations result
from policy changes, natural phenomena (e.g., severe droughts,
excessive rainfall), governance interventions (e.g., new ZDCs),
shifts in land-usedecision logics (e.g., exhaustion of suitable lands
for expansion in a given geographic region), and market events
(e.g., significant changes in commodity prices), among others.
Recovery measures how trade relations restore after having
been disrupted by shocks in two ways. First, locations and ac-
tors that had stable relations can recover the same stable config-
uration of relations as before. Second, these locations or actors
may recover by reconfiguring their network toward another set of
persistent relationships, but with a different configuration of rela-
tions with different actors and places.
Metrics to Assess Stickiness in Brazil’s Soy Exports
We represent the Brazilian soy export supply chain29 as a tempo-
ral network76,77 (see Experimental Procedures). This temporal
network is the aggregate of soy transactions, or commercial re-
lationships, between three levels of supply chain actors (nodes),
over 2003–2017. These three levels of actors (n = 2,304) are lo-
gistics hubs (LHs; n = 468), exporting traders (n = 1,709), and im-
porting countries (n = 127). LHs are jurisdictions (municipalities)
of soy production and trade in Brazil (see Supplemental Experi-
mental Procedures). LHs aggregate the behavior of soy farmers
located within the logistic range of these logistics and commer-
cial hubs for soy processing and export. They are regional mar-
ket places for defining farm-gate soy prices, storage, and freight
fees, acting figuratively as soy ‘‘drains.’’
Traders include exporters and importers, who buy soy directly
from farmers or indirectly through local small cereals
Figure 1. The Three Dimensions of Stickiness
(A) Persistence is the property of supply chains to have trade linkage config-
urations that remain highly similar over time. Medium persistence may char-
acterize networks that have a medium similarity of trade linkages over time or
that oscillate between low and high similarities across pairs of succes-
sive years.
(B) Resistance is the property of maintaining linkages unaltered in relation to a
given shock.
(C) Recovery corresponds to the reestablishment of stable network configu-
rations after a shock, either with the same previous configuration or the sta-
bilization of a new configuration. The last two dimensions are assessed based
on an identified shock.
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warehouses and cooperatives located in these LHs or neigh-
boring municipalities. These traders export either raw or crushed
beans into oil, meal, and cake, which are primary inputs for ani-
mal feed, biofuels, or cooking oils, for example. Our dataset
comprises only export transactions, raw and crushed, thus
excluding soy transactions destined for domestic consumption
in Brazil.29,78 The dataset covers the period 2003–2017, where
each year is a snapshot of the network, aggregating all individual
soy transactions that occurred over that year between two ac-
tors in annual transactions. We thus represent the entire move-
ment of the supply chain over 2003–2017 as a set of 15 slices
or snapshots. We then compare these snapshots to calculate
the similarity of the supply chain network over time.
The network is directed, i.e., soy only flows in one direction,
from LHs to traders, and then from traders to countries. Flows
are either outgoing or incoming depending on the actor’s posi-
tion in the supply chain, i.e., while one actor is supplying soy (out-
going flow), the next one is sourcing it (incoming flow). We mea-
sure stickiness as the similarity or change in the configuration of
trading partners around each actor between two points in time—
i.e., two snapshots—employing metrics from temporal network
analysis (Ci and TCi; Equations 1 and 2 in Experimental Proced-
ures). Ci is the topological overlap,76which measures howmuch
the configuration of the supply chain network changes from the
first snapshot compared with the second. TCi is the temporal
average topological overlap, which is the average of several
consecutive Cis over time.
This measurement can be applied to the specific configuration
of commercial relations around one specific region or actor
(node), or at the overall network level. Ci, our primary stickiness
metric, measures the topological overlap—i.e., how much the
network configuration around each actor (node) changed be-
tween two snapshots. In other words, howmuch the commercial
relationships of this actor changed, for example, from 2003 to
2004 (Equation 1 in Experimental Procedures). TCi is the tempo-
ral average of Ci over a sequence of successive snapshots
covering the analyzed period (2003–2017) for each actor or
group of actors. C is the temporal correlation coefficient over
the entire supply network (Equation 4 in Experimental Proced-
ures), i.e., the aggregation of all individual Cis in varying timewin-
dows. A time window is an interval between two snapshots,
which can be 1 year, e.g., 2003–2004, 14 years, e.g., 2003–
2017, or any interval in between. C measures the stickiness of
the overall supply chain network over all possible time windows,
i.e., applied to varying time intervals between two snapshots.
Equations 1, 2, and 3 (Experimental Procedures) are steps to
calculate C.
These indices vary between zero (i.e., a complete reconfigura-
tion of trade relationships between the two snapshots) and one
(i.e., full stickiness, all trade relations observed remain identical).
Zero includes situations where the supply network has no link-
ages in one of the observed years. In large and complex net-
works, such as Brazil’s soy export supply chain, we hardly find
either one or zero at the whole network level, meaning that at
this level, some linkages are always maintained, and new link-
ages always appear.76,77,79 However, when looking at specific
network configurations around actors, we find zeros or ones.
From a network perspective, we decompose trade relations in
commodity supply chains in ‘‘linkages’’ and ‘‘flows,’’ corre-
sponding to the presence of a commercial relationship between
two partners, and the volume of commodities exchanged be-
tween them, respectively, over discrete periods. These two ap-
proaches provide complementary information, allowing analysis
of changes in the presence and intensity of trade relations and
verification of whether a linkage reconfiguration is related to an
increase or decrease in specific flows.
For example, an LH may trade slightly varying soy volumes
every year with the same set of exporters. The stickiness
measured on linkages will be 1 over these years, while indices
on flows will be slightly below 1, as the changes in volume imply
that some linkages are trading more or less soy than the year
before, thus changing the flow configuration. Note that these
stickiness metrics measure the absolute magnitude of changes
in network configuration, notwithstanding their direction (appear-
ance or disappearance of linkages, increases, or decreases in
flows). Although this information is partly independent, changes
in linkages and flows are strongly correlated (Figure S1). For
clarity, the main text presents only results on linkages. We repli-
cate all analyses in flows in the Supplemental Information.
These indices are scaled from 0 to 1 and are independent of
the size of the network, making it possible to compare indices
within groups, e.g., among traders. Although the different types
of supply chain relationships have a distinct nature and corre-
spond to groups of actors with a distinct agency, the scaling of
the indices also makes it possible to compare the values
observed across groups, e.g., comparing traders with LHs.
Here, we explore the six types of supply chain relationships pre-
sent in our Brazil’s soy export data: (A) logistics hubs (LHs) sup-
plying traders, (B) LHs supplying countries, (C) traders sourcing
from LHs, (D) traders supplying countries, (E) countries sourcing
from traders, and (F) countries sourcing from LHs (Figure 2). Yet,
we focus our discussion on traders in their sourcing relationships
with LHs and supplying relationships with countries. Other data-
sets might include other types of supply chain relationships,
such as retailers selling to consumers or farmers buying fertil-
izers from input suppliers.
The Stickiness of Brazil’s Soy Export Supply Chain
Observing the first dimension of the stickiness (i.e., persistence)
of different sets of actors in the Brazilian soy export supply chain
reveals that traders overall have relatively low stickiness. LHs
and import countries have somewhatmoderate stickiness levels.
However, each group is heterogeneous (Figure 3). The soy sup-
ply chain is highly concentrated, with 31 traders (of 1,709 in total)
accounting for 82% of the total soy traded. Traders with the
largest market shares have higher average stickiness (Figure 3,
t test, p = 9.107 3 1013). A large group of small traders (1,678
companies) is comparatively non-sticky and represents 18% of
the total soy exported. A few LHs (n = 35) were the source of
62% of the total exported soy volume, while the 29 largest
consuming countries imported 97% of total soy in the analyzed
period. Both groups have higher average stickiness than the
average LHs (t test, p < 2.2 3 1016) and countries (t test, p =
2.208 3 1014) analyzed here (Figure 3).
We correlated the temporal average stickiness (TCi) with soy-
deforestation risk from Trase.18,29 ‘‘Soy deforestation risk (hect-
ares) is the soy deforestation allocated to the actors along the
supply chain in proportion to the volume of soy that they export
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from a given jurisdiction, relative to the total production of soy (by
all producers) in the same jurisdiction. Deforestation risk for a
given year of export is based on deforestation that occurred in
the previous five years, during which time the soy that is being
exported was planted and harvested.’’78
When observing the network of traders sourcing from LHs and
supplying countries (Figures 2A and 2B), we found that stickier
traders also exhibit higher soy-deforestation risk (r = 0.22 and
0.27; t test, p < 1.983 109 and p < 1.513 1014, respectively).
This correlation suggests that traders who have been stably
sourcing from a set of LHs or supplying to a stable set of coun-
tries also present higher soy-deforestation risks. Moreover, the
stickiness measurements on these two types of supply chain re-
lationships, i.e., traders sourcing fromLH (Figure 2C) and supply-
ing countries (Figure 2D), are also strongly correlated (r = 0.95
and p < 0.001), indicating that traders who have stable relation-
ships with their suppliers also have stable relationships with their
customers. This association suggests a high potential for signal
transmission from consumers to producers in the supply chain,
including a signal demanding to reduce deforestation.
Testing the difference in the temporal average stickiness (TCi)
between ZDC signatory and non-signatory traders,18 we found
that ZDC traders are significantly stickier than non-ZDC, both
whenmeasuring their stickiness in sourcing from LHs (Figure 2C;
t test, p = 1.042 3 108) and in supplying countries (Figure 2D; t
test, p = 1.765 3 108).
Figure 2. The Six Types of Brazil’s Soy Supply Chain Relationships
Themeasurement of stickiness focuses on the set of linkages and the changes in their configurations around each actor in the network. The blue color denotes the
focal group of actors (i.e., the nodes fromwhose perspective the analysis is being done). The blue arrows denote the linkages of the supply chain being analyzed.
(A) Logistics hubs (LHs) supplying traders; (B) LHs supplying countries; (C) traders sourcing from LHs; (D) traders supplying countries; (E) countries sourcing from
traders; and (F) countries sourcing from LHs.
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A temporal profile of stickiness between consecutive snap-
shots also confirms that traders and LHs with large market
shares (Figures 4B1 and 4B2) are stickier than their respective
overall groups (Figures 4A1 and 4A2).
For most types of supply chain relationships, especially the
linkages between LHs and traders (Figures 2A and 2C), the in-
ter-annual stickiness increases over time. When comparing the
2003 snapshot directly with 2017, all relationships become less
sticky (Figures 4A1, 4A2, 4B1, and 4B2). Thus, even if supply
chain configurations appear relatively stable year to year, small
step-by-step reconfigurations over short time intervals lead to
major overall changes in the long term.
This difference in the measured time frame may reflect various
processes, including expansion into new frontiers, and new-
comers. Calculating the temporal correlation coefficient (C;
Equations 1, 2, 3, and 4 in Experimental Procedures) shows
that, when observing themean value of stickiness for all possible
time windows, the overall stickiness of the entire supply chain
network decreases the longer the time window is (Figure 5).
For example, the stickiness will be higher when comparing the
supply network over two consecutive years, such as 2003 versus
2004, in contrast with comparingmore temporally distant config-
urations, such as 2003 versus 2017.
The geographic analysis of the stickiness of LHs in their sup-
plying relationships with traders shows that certain LHs have
been supplying soy to exactly (TCi = 1, n = 13) or mostly the
same (0.76% TCi% 0.99, n = 75) set of traders over time (Fig-
ure 6). Showing the various levels of engagement between re-
gions of production and distribution and soy traders reveals
the potential land use accountability of traders operating in these
places. Some LHs in two important agricultural frontiers in
Brazil—Northern Mato Grosso and the ‘‘Matopiba’’ (Maranha˜o,
Tocantins, Piauı´, and Bahia) frontier in the Cerrado—present
high stickiness with traders, suggesting that impacts of soy pro-
duction and trade can be consistently associated with these
specific traders in those regions.
Stickiness Dimensions in Brazil’s Soy Exports
Here, we illustrate how the three dimensions of stickiness
(persistence, resistance, and recovery) manifest in relation
to shocks and other factors using exemplary cases in traders
(Figure 7). We use the stickiness of soy linkages (Ci), the tem-
poral average stickiness (TCi), and the stickiness measured
on the longest time window (the supply network configuration
for 2003 compared with 2017) (see Experimental Proced-
ures). Formally, attributing a causal relation to specific
factors requires further analyses beyond the scope of
this paper.
Bunge, the single largest soy trader in Brazil, had a persistent
configuration of soy linkages from LHs (Figure 7). In contrast with
Santa Rosa Agroindustrial and Agrenco, Bunge also appears to
have had a more resistant configuration to the various shocks
that occurred during 2008–2010, including the global financial
crisis and the Amazon Soy Moratorium (ASM), which all three
companies signed in 2006. Santa Rosa Agroindustrial had a
persistent pattern until 2008, and then experienced a profound
reconfiguration of its sourcing linkages, with a period of high
instability between 2008 and 2010, and then recovered a sticky
pattern from 2011 onward. Despite the collapse of Santa Rosa’s
linkages configuration in 2008–2010, the configuration of the first
snapshot (2003) and the last (2017) were quite similar (index,
~0.62) (Figure 7A2). This long-term similarity indicates that after
having been disrupted for several years, Santa Rosa Agroindus-
trial recovered a similar network of sourcing LHs to a greater
extent than Bunge. Agrenco, in contrast, exemplifies a non-
persistent pattern, with stable linkages configurations some-
times lasting for two consecutive years, but then strongly reor-
ganizing, and being unable to recover any stable sourcing
pattern after 2009.
A proper causal analysis to explain why different traders pre-
sent distinct patterns is beyond the scope of this paper. Never-
theless, these examples illustrate that small local traders like
Santa Rosa Agroindustrial are subject to particular circum-
stances that may affect the observed stickiness patterns. De-
pending on market circumstances, these small local traders
may venture into direct exports. However, they may also decide
to sell their stocks for other traders to export or for local demand,
thereby disappearing from the export registry in a given year.
Indeed, Santa Rosa appears with zero exports in 2009, leading
to the stickiness metric dropping to zero when comparing the
similarity of Santa Rosa’s supply network in 2008 with 2009. In
2010, Santa Rosa resumed exporting, so that this new network
configuration also produced a stickiness value of zero when
comparing 2009 with 2010. Then the 2010–2011 measurement
Figure 3. Overall Distribution of the First
Dimension of Stickiness (Persistence)
Measured on the configuration of commercial link-
ages (TCi, Equation 2 in Experimental Procedures).
Over the whole dataset (‘‘Overall’’), traders are the
least sticky group in the Brazilian soy supply chain.
‘‘Selected’’ includes only logistics hubs and traders
that commercialized at least 1% of the total soy
volume in any year after 2008 and countries that
imported at least 0.5% of the total soy volume in the
same period. These selected traders, logistics
hubs, and countries are stickier overall. (See the
equivalent on flows in Figure S2). The bars in the
boxplots represent quartiles. The horizontal bar in-
side the colored range indicates the median. The
upper and lower ranges indicate the 25% and 75%
quartiles, respectively. The upper and lower black
lines indicate the max and min values.
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goes up to 0.7, indicating that the supply network of 2011 was
around 70% similar to that in 2010.
DISCUSSION
Stickiness as a Conceptual and Methodological Tool
Our results reveal key insights into Brazilian soy supply chains:
stickiness is higher for large traders, and increases over time,
which may reflect the progressive consolidation of the relation-
ships between traders and specific regions of production
through investments in infrastructures or business relations.
Further, stickiness typically decreases when the time interval
observed becomes longer. Fromone year to the next, the config-
uration of the Brazilian soy network presents only small changes.
However, these changes accumulate over time so that within the
15 years covered by our assessment, the supply chain has sub-
stantially reconfigured, as observed for a pig supply chain in
Germany.77
Our results reflect three characteristics of Brazil’s soy supply
chain: (1) market concentration, including potential infrastructure
lock-in of large traders in some regions, e.g., through the owner-
ship of port terminals and export corridors; (2) the strategy of
large traders to diversify their sourcing regions tomitigate supply
risks, and therefore a tendency to have relatively high stickiness
given their ubiquity; (3) the existence of many small traders
(1,678 companies) that engage in intermittent trading and
brokerage, without strong geographic dependency, following
market circumstances and opportunities.
Our proposed metrics allow characterizing the whole
network, specific linkages, and flows, as well as the behavior
of actors; i.e., decision-making entities (companies and regions
of production, distribution, and consumption, representing the
aggregate of individual producers’ and consumers’ trade be-
haviors). These metrics can apply to different types of relations
across supply and value chains—i.e., material flows such as
soy volumes here, but also financial flows or others—to inves-
tigate the existence and changes in linkages configuration and
their intensity (e.g., volumes traded). Examples from the Brazil-
ian soy supply chain suggest that the three dimensions capture
the dynamics of trade relationships and can be approached
with our method.
Beyond our set of indices (Equations 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 in
Experimental Procedures), other metrics can be used to
measure the similarity of the network around specific
nodes over time or the frequency or persistence of specific
linkages. Our dataset on Brazilian soy has a fine granularity
(i.e., subnational production areas and distribution points, im-
porting and exporting companies), but the same approach
can also be applied over country-to-country data or other
levels of detail.
Further methodological research would help to refine the
indices and their information content, the measurement of
the different stickiness dimensions and quantitative thresh-
olds to characterize them, and specific procedures for supply
chains covering distinct products, scales, and types of flows.
Additional investigations are needed to formally define and
identify shocks and analyze their impacts on trade linkages
and flows.68 The stickiness concept can further our under-
standing of various processes across commodity supply or
value chains ranging from development,80 macroeconomics,
and political economy81 to supply chain management and
business strategies.82 Here, we focus on appraising the po-
tential effectiveness of supply chain ZDCs and other similar
interventions.15
Figure 4. Temporal Stickiness Profile in the First Dimension of Stickiness (Persistence)
Measured on the configuration of commercial linkages (Ci and Cm; Equations 1 and 3 in Experimental Procedures). In (A1) and (A2), LHs are stickier than other
actors’ group in both types of relationships. Nonetheless, in (B1) and (B2) the selected traders sourcing from LHs show higher stickiness than the overall group in
(A). (A2) and (B2) complement the temporal profiles by showing the temporal average (TCi; Equation 2) and the Ci calculated for the comparison directly between
2003 and 2017, instead of for each consecutive biannual snapshots compared. See the equivalent figure measured on flows in Figure S3. Also see a com-
plementary Figure S4 zooming in on the relationships of different categories of traders (overall, small, and large).
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Understanding Stickiness for Sustainability Governance
Analyzing stickiness in commodity trade can contribute to
improve territorial and supply chain governance for sustainabil-
ity, including reducing deforestation, carbon emissions, and
biodiversity loss.
First, understanding stickiness can contribute to explaining
and projecting the restructuring of trade flows under changing
governance contexts or other shocks.24 Past stickiness patterns
can inform onwhich trade relations aremore likely to persist over
time, be resistant to shocks, or recover from them. Changes in
deforestation regulations alter soy and cattle expansion and ex-
ports, but the mediating role of specific supply chain actors re-
mains unclear.24 Identifying areas and actors with low stickiness
can help to understand their instability under changing policy or
market conditions, as well as supply chains’, companies’, or re-
gions’ vulnerabilities to shocks such as newcomers or climatic
changes.
Second, there is a growing momentum of supply chain inter-
ventions, such as ZDCs, to improve the sustainability of land
use and other dimensions of supply chains.12,38 In 2006, Green-
peace launched a campaign blaming McDonald’s consumers in
Europe for causing deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon.13 In
response, soy companies and environmental NGOs established
the Amazon Soy Moratorium (ASM) to address this growing
awareness of corporate accountability for unsustainable com-
modity production and tackle reputational risks.13,16 Other
related initiatives ensued, including the New York Declaration
on Forests, the Amsterdam Declarations, Tropical Forests Alli-
ance 2020, and companies’ pledges.12 Assessments of the
effectiveness, coverage, and benefit to corporate actors of these
zero-deforestation initiatives15,19,83–85 rest on a poor under-
standing of how strongly actors are connected to production pla-
ces and how supply chain configurations are affected by these
initiatives. We hypothesize that the relations between stickiness
and supply chain governance are multiple. If supply chains are
not geographically sticky, these commitmentsmay be less effec-
tive, as traders will lack a sufficient engagement with producing
regions to influence changes in their suppliers. In the reverse di-
rection, supply chain interventions can also create, increase, or
decrease stickiness.
We hypothesize that the ASM may have consolidated the
export relationships between places with already deforested
available lands, signatory traders, and European countries.
However, it may have also created instability in other places by
creating market space for non-signatory traders supplying the
growing Chinese soy demand from municipalities where expan-
sion was still occurring. About 350,000 tons of soy were har-
vested in the 2016/2017 season in violation of the ASM,28 sug-
gesting that non-signatory companies entered this market and
bought this soy. We speculate that the entry of these non-signa-
tory companies decreased stickiness in these municipalities.
Consequently, the strength of actor-geography connections is
likely to have important implications for actors’ accountability.
Traders sourcing in spot markets with low stickiness may be
held more hardly accountable for the impacts associated with
soy production than actors with consistent sourcing patterns.
Further, stickiness may not only influence the effectiveness of
ZDCs and other interventions but also condition their emergence
and signing in the first place. Our results show that ZDC signa-
tories, for example, also have the largest market shares and
the highest stickiness scores for their sourcing places and sup-
plying countries. This higher stickiness may reflect not only the
investments and facilities installed in these places but also the
long-term trust relationships and the role of embeddedness49
in shaping social-economic relations. Traders with such em-
beddedness and long-term engagement may be in a favorable
position to sign and implement ZDCs.
Monitoring the stickiness and deforestation risk exposure of
each company over time18 allows for targeted efforts on specific
regions in the supply chain. Companies with non-sticky patterns
may require more robust monitoring and verification tools than
sticky companies sourcing consistently from the same locations.
In contrast, sticky actors may constitute stronger levers to influ-
ence their sourcing regions with more additionality in curbing
deforestation, not only in their direct suppliers.11,13–15,18
Stickiness may also affect the mechanisms through which in-
terventions are transmitted along supply chains: strategies of
sticky and non-sticky traders to achieve a ZDC may differ, with
different overall impacts on the sector. Non-sticky traders may
easily achieve targets related to their own embedded deforesta-
tion by shifting their sourcing to compliant suppliers. Neverthe-
less, this approach may have less effect on territorial deforesta-
tion overall, in contrast with sticky traders that have to steer
changes on the ground to achieve a commitment.27 These
different approaches may have distinct implications for socio-
economic development and the spatial distribution of ZDC
effectiveness.
Stickiness reflects stable long-term relations between actors.
We hypothesize that the level of stickiness may thus also relate
to and inform on the level of trust between regions of production
and distribution, traders, and consuming countries.50 Trust may
be crucial for the success of supply chain interventions, and
gaining insights on this level of trust may thus inform the sustain-
ability strategy to be implemented and the likelihood of its
Figure 5. Overall Stickiness (Persistence) of Brazil’s Export Soy Sup-
ply Chain
Calculated over all different configurations of comparisons between years
separated by increasing time intervals.
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success. Further works could explore these various hypotheses
empirically.
Third, by informing on how supply chains behave, adapt over
time, and react to shocks, analyzing stickiness can further our
understanding of deforestation leakage and other complex
land-use spillover dynamics stemming from territorial interven-
tions and other regulatory changes.27,28,86,87 The stickiness of
consolidated traders in already-cleared regions in the Amazon
may have facilitated their decision to sign the ASM agreement,
acknowledging that they could expand into the neighboring
Cerrado.84,85,88
Leakage across supply chains (e.g., deforestation being dis-
placed from soy to beef27,89) and regions (e.g., displacement of
deforestation from the Amazon to the Cerrado13,84) is likely to
follow the patterns of sticky relationships.25 Traders facing an
intervention that curbs deforestation and agricultural expansion
Figure 6. Spatial Distribution of Stickiness
(Persistence) of Traders to Sourcing Areas
A map with stickiness measured on soy flow
configuration displays similar patterns (Figure S5).
Municipalities in gray produce soy, but this soy is
bought by traders through one of the logistics hub
municipalities. Note that local soy transactions
destined for local consumption in poultry or pork
facilities are not captured by this dataset.
(e.g., in the Amazon) may seek room for
expansion in regions unaffected by the
intervention (e.g., in the Cerrado) where
they already have sticky relationships.
Stickiness analyses might have informed
on which Cerrado municipalities were
more likely to experience increased
soy deforestation after the ASM
implementation.84
Stickiness levels can also result from
anticipation behaviors. Companies can
enhance their fluidity by building new as-
sets in places they expect to remain unaf-
fected by interventions, or outsourcing lo-
gistics and storage services in locations
targeted by interventions. In ASM proced-
ures, soy purchased by indirect suppliers
in the Amazon, i.e., local cooperatives or
small grain warehouses, are not subject
to the verification procedures applied
when traders source directly from
farmers.90 Traders have thus an incentive
to become more fluid and outsource their
facilities, while possessing physical assets
in places targeted by interventions may
become a competitive hindrance.
Fourth, stickiness can inform on trade
dependency and market concentration.
At the country level, dependency theory
suggests that developing countries face
reinforcing feedback loops between the
creation of strong export linkages with
wealthy countries and the expansion of
land use with detrimental environmental impacts.91 The sticki-
ness concept and method can improve the understanding of
how agricultural supply chains and land use determine each
other. This reciprocal dynamic includes legacies of past invest-
ments, infrastructure decisions,23 corporate strategies to in-
crease market share, and positioning in distinct market
segments.92
A Research Agenda on Stickiness in Commodity Trade
Two key questions may constitute a research agenda for sticki-
ness in commodity supply chains, particularly concerning
sustainability.
First, how sticky are various trading relationships, and what
are the factors and mechanisms that explain variations in stick-
iness between specific actors and locations? These factors likely
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vary at different levels (e.g., company to company, or country to
county), and steps in the supply chain. The concept of territori-
ality, i.e., how global production networks are spatially
dispersed, can contribute to explaining the level of supply chain
stickiness, as clustered actors tend to have more rigid relation-
ships than dispersed ones.93
Producer-driven commodity chains—i.e., those in which
large transnational manufacturers or processors play the cen-
tral roles—are expected to have high barriers to entry for new
producers, such as the soy industry for new producers of soy
outputs such as oil and cake.36,59,60 These high barriers, due
to the need for appropriate capital and expertise, may lead pro-
ducer-driven chains to be relatively sticky, as downstream ac-
tors such as feed companies and food retailers depend on a
concentrated set of processors. In contrast, buyer-driven
chains, such as vegetables retailed by supermarkets, have
lower barriers to entry and may be less sticky. In this case,
large-branded supermarkets can easily change their suppliers
drawing from a dynamic pool of vegetable producers. New
buyers can also enter the market and compete for a pool of
producers by offering more advantageous purchasing
conditions.94
The governance structure of value chains—i.e., how authority
and power relationships, such as through market shares and
price-setting power, determine the allocation of benefits and re-
sources across chains—also influences the options and bargai-
ning power of actors and thus their stickiness.61 Social networks
and embeddedness95 also likely influence stickiness.
Geographic factors, including the availability of land for further
expansion, may influence the involvement of supply chain actors
with specific places. Producers’ stickiness can be tied to the
presence of infrastructures from one versus different companies,
or preferential contracts, while consumers’ stickiness depends
on their attachment to brands.37
Countries may shift sourcing across other countries while a
local trader may be tied to a place where it has a silo or other
infrastructure. Stickiness may also be influenced by policies
that increase traceability or compliance with specific sanitary
norms or preferences—such as the EU refusal of genetically
modified (GMO) crops—or provide preferential market ac-
cess.32,92 Over the long term, environmental and other policies
affect infrastructure development and production factors such
as labor force, which in turn determines land-use displacement
across geographies.23
Second, how does an actor’s stickiness influence patterns of
land use in the geographies where they engage, and more
broadly, the socio-environmental impacts of commodity produc-
tion? Further, how does stickiness interact with various gover-
nance interventions, i.e., territorial or jurisdictional interventions,
supply chain, or public policy interventions, aiming to manage
land use more sustainably, and does this influence their
effectiveness?
Formulating and testing more specific hypotheses relating to
the relationship between stickiness and land-use governance
can help to design more effective interventions. In the specific
context of ZDCs, we propose that (1) stickier companies are
more likely to implement ZDCs by requesting changes in their
suppliers’ practices as opposed to shifting their sourcing pat-
terns, and (2) interventions on stickier companies or territories
are less likely to result in leakage. Testing these hypotheses re-
quires further work beyond the scope of this study.
Conclusion
We presented the notion of stickiness to measure and charac-
terize the level of stability and rigidity of supply chain relations,
decomposed into the persistence, resistance, and recovery of
these relations. Metrics from network analysis can measure
these dimensions for both the presence of linkages and the in-
tensity of flows.
Understanding stickiness can inform policies and initiatives to
address deforestation, in particular, to assess the potential
effectiveness of supply chain ZDCs. If supply chains are not
geographically sticky, these commitments may be less effective,
and less likely to be signed, as companies may lack the capacity
to influence their suppliers downstream. This relationship be-
tween stickiness and ZDCs requires further investigation.
Analyzing stickiness revealed insights into the behavior of pro-
duction places and traders active in the Brazilian soy supply
chain. Brazilian soy traders with the largest market share and
with ZDCs exhibit stickier geographic sourcing patterns. Soy-
deforestation risk among traders is correlated with stickiness.
The linkages between production places and traders become
increasingly sticky over time. Specific regions, in particular cur-
rent agricultural and deforestation frontiers, have higher sticki-
ness. The cause-effect relationships behind these patterns
require further investigations.
Further research could improve the methodological tools for
empirically assessing the different dimensions of stickiness,
especially related to the identification of supply chain shocks
and their effects. These improvements can enhance our under-
standing of the factors that influence stickiness patterns, the
Figure 7. Temporal Stickiness (Persistence) Measured on Selected
Traders
Traders’ sourcing linkages from logistics hubs. See the same graphs with
measurements on trade flows in Figure S6. (A2) complements the temporal
profiles by showing the temporal average stickiness (TCi; Equation 2, Exper-
imental Procedures) and the Ci calculated for the direct comparison between
2003 and 2017, instead of for each subsequent biannual snapshot.
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impacts of supply chain dynamics, and the mediating role of ac-
tors on socio-environmental dimensions. Research on stickiness
can inform the development of solutions for curbing deforesta-
tion and promoting sustainable land use and supply chains.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Resource Availability
Lead Contact
Further information and requests for resources and reagents should be
directed to and will be fulfilled by the Lead Contact, Tiago Nogueira Pimenta
dos Reis (tiago.reis@uclouvain.be/tiagopimentadosreis@gmail.com).
Materials Availability
This study did not generate new unique materials.
Data and Code Availability
The datasets and code generated during this study are available at Zenodo re-
pository: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3901699.
Designing a Conceptual Framework for Stickiness
Several fields have explored how to describe the stability and rigidity of sup-
ply chain patterns and trade networks, and the processes that underpin
them. First, agricultural economics investigates stickiness in international
trade, showing, under the so-called ‘‘Armington assumption,’’ that in global
markets with free trade, agricultural products from one place are not fully
substitutable with products from another place, even after accounting for
price differences.25,30 The often-used gravity model explains the amount of
country-to-country flows as a function of economy sizes, i.e., gross domestic
product (GDP) and geographic distance.54,55 However, this literature says lit-
tle about geographic stickiness between places and actors, except for clus-
tering in manufacturing supply chains,58 and lacks explicit articulation of the
role of stickiness in sustainability governance of supply chains, particularly
for ZDCs.15 Second, research on GCCs,59 GVCs,60 and production networks
(GPNs)62 show how actors, including raw material producers, traders, and
retailers, create and maintain specific trade networks. This research remains
based on specific case studies, lacking the large datasets linking localized
production, supply chain actors, and consumption places that are necessary
to explore quantitatively how supply chain configurations react to various
changes in markets and policies.66 Third, studies on social-ecological resil-
ience and biosphere stewardship71,72 have analyzed how social-ecological
systems resist, adapt, transform, and recover from external shocks.96–98
They distinguish the two dimensions of resistance (i.e., the ability of a system
to withstand shocks by maintaining its functions) and recovery (i.e., the ability
of a system to bounce back to its previous state after being per-
turbed).68,98,99 In the next paragraphs, we explain in more detail how these
three streams of literature contribute to designing a conceptual framework
for stickiness.
Agricultural economics studies show that in global markets with free trade,
agricultural products from one place are not fully substitutable with products
from another place, even after accounting for price differences.31–33 Standard
econometric studies and economic models use empirically calibrated ‘‘Ar-
mington trade substitution elasticities.’’30 These studies account for the differ-
entiation of products based on production place, and for the fact that price
shocks occurring in one country do not spread homogenously in the global
market, but predominantly affect the key trade partners of that
country.30,34,73,75
For example, a drought in a few specific municipalities of Brazil, as a soy ex-
porting country, will affect local producers and traders by impairing their ca-
pacity to deliver future contracts. As a result, this local shortage of supply
may increase regional soy prices, but this will not affect global markets, as
most traders can change sourcing to other regions not affected by this local
shock. In global commodities, for global prices to be affected, there need to
be higher scale shocks. In this sense, a local price shock caused by local
climate variability will differentiate soy according to its production location
becausemunicipalities that did not suffer from this drought will havemore sup-
ply and lower prices to feed global demand.
For supply chains at firms level, the economic literature identifies some fac-
tors influencing stickiness, mainly input and output specificity.34,35 Input and
output specificity refers to the properties and characteristics of materials
used in manufacturing and the resulting products that differentiate them. For
example, soy farmers who use specific breeds of GMO seeds are highly sticky
to the companies that supply the specific set of agrochemicals that function
with those seeds. By acquiring certain types of GMO seeds, a farmer may
establish an enduring commercial relationship with the suppliers of an
adequate and specific set of inputs.36,92
The actor’s relative position in the supply chain, which is dependent on the
elasticity of demand faced by the consumer-facing company,11,37,38 also influ-
ences stickiness because of the embeddedness nature of some commodities
in food systems.11 For example, soy is used formultiple purposes that are opa-
que to consumers, such as animal feed and biofuel; only a small fraction of soy
goes to direct human consumption. This opacity means that it is relatively easy
for intermediate companies, such as traders and processors, to be non-sticky
with their suppliers. These intermediate companies have a distant relative sup-
ply chain position from end consumers. This distance implies they can shift
sourcing places from time to time, as they do not receive direct consumer
pressure for accountability.
Geographic proximity influences the country-to-country trade pat-
terns25,39,42 significantly. However, the literature also shows other more qual-
itative factors influencing international trade, such as ethnic networks,40 colo-
nial linkages and common language,41,42 piracy,43 governance regimes,44
institutional quality and differences between countries,45 and the countries’
capacity to enforce contracts.46 The social economy concept of embedded-
ness47,48 complements our review of stickiness by acknowledging the social
structure and trust of interfirm networks and commercial relationships.49 Un-
derstanding the embeddedness of social relations50 in supply chain economic
and geographic relationships is crucial to advance the stickiness research
agenda.
Lock-in effects are equally important factors of stickiness in supply chains,
mainly technological,51 the fixing of relative preferences over time,52 social
dependence, and investments.53 The gravity model explains the amount of
country-to-country flows as a function of economy sizes, i.e., GDP, and
geographic distance,54,55which can also partially explain stickiness or, in other
words, why some country-to-country flows persist over time. Furthermore, the
Melitz model56 suggests that stickiness depends on a country’s exposure to
international trade, where more productive firms would access foreign mar-
kets, thus havingmore volatile supply chains. In contrast, less productive firms
would be sticky to domestic consumers. Varying levels of trade openness
would cause different supply chain responses and more or less volatility in
sourcing and supplying patterns.57
These economic studies focus on providing robust estimates of trade sub-
stitution elasticities for different commodities, and on explaining stickiness in
interfirm and country-to-country trade. Nonetheless, they say little about
geographic stickiness between places and actors, except for clustering in
manufacturing supply chains.58 This literature also lacks explicit articulation
of the role of stickiness in sustainability governance of supply chains, particu-
larly for ZDCs.15
Research on GCCs59 and GVCs60 provides a complementary perspective.
They move beyond structural country-to-country relations and show that
various actors such as raw material producers, traders, processors, and re-
tailers play a role in creating and maintaining specific trade networks. The
notion of GPNs62 highlights that companies and non-state actors exercise po-
wer and agency to shape the legal, governance, and policy frameworks and
contexts in which they operate.61–64 Most quantitative research on supply
chain configurations investigates structural factors at the country-to-country
level.65 As far as we know, research on GCCs, GVCs, and GPNs remains
based on specific case studies. It lacks the large datasets linking localized pro-
duction, supply chain actors, and consumption locations that are necessary to
explore quantitatively how supply chain network configurations react to
various changes in markets and policies.66
Here, we bridge these theoretical and empirical approaches by analyzing
supply chains as a network.69,70We extend the notion of stickiness formulated
in economics through the analysis of supply chains as proposed in GCC, GVC,
and GPN research. We consider stickiness as a moderating factor of the exis-
tence, and the potential effectiveness, of supply chain sustainability initia-
tives,15 particularly ZDCs. The notion of resilience in social-ecological systems
and biosphere stewardship71,72 inspires us to define the dimensions or
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characteristics of stickiness, namely resistance and recovery. Extensive in-
quiry on network approaches22,68 and in supply chains74 is also crucial for
our stickiness approach. Nonetheless, here we do not aim to characterize all
the aspects of resilience of production, consumption locations, and networks,
as well as of actors in the supply chains, and the capacity of these actors to
adapt and transform. We simply aim to provide a concept and methodological
approach to initiate those types of enquiry.
Assessing Stickiness in the Brazilian Soy Supply Chain
Network analyses are applied to various sustainability issues, including social-
ecological, biological, food webs,68 supply chain,100 land acquisitions,101 and
virtual water trade.102 In many cases, they aim to describe and understand the
persistence and reconfigurations of these networks. These studies offer inspi-
rations for our methodology for characterizing trade stickiness.
The Brazilian soy trading data from Trase version 2.3 (Supplemental Exper-
imental Procedures, Data and Methods) includes transactions of soy exported
as raw beans, oil, meal, or cake.29 We assembled this dataset as a network
linking LHs, traders, and countries of consumption. We did not measure stick-
iness on all soy-producing municipalities. The allocation of soy flows from the
logistic hubs (LHs) to the municipalities of production in the Trase data is the
result of linear programming. This methodmay create artifacts in the measure-
ments of the inter-annual stability of the network configuration at the munici-
pality level.78 LH-level data rely directly on official trade records and are repre-
sentative of a set of soy farms within the municipal boundaries in which they
are located, but also for neighboring municipalities, as these LHs gather soy
produced in a surrounding region with viable logistic connectivity. We also
clarify that we do not consider trade linkages with local feed companies and
processors that supply soy for Brazilian domestic consumption. All soy
consumed internally is treated as a single node called ‘‘domestic consump-
tion’’ in the LHs and traders network levels, and as ‘‘Brazil’’ at the country desti-
nation network level.
We transformed the raw data (in the format of edges lists) into adjacency
matrices. Each aggregate year of trade data between 2003 and 2017 became
one adjacency matrix, representing one snapshot of the network. We call each
year’s aggregate transaction data a snapshot because our network comprises
15 snapshots or annual aggregate transaction data. Each stickiness measure-
ment implies comparing two snapshots. In one set of adjacency matrices, we
replaced entries by 1, representing the existence of a linkage between two
adjacent nodes, and 0 when no link existed, thus creating an unweighted ad-
jacency matrix (or binary interaction matrix). We used this to measure sticki-
ness on trade linkages. All measurements presented here in the main text
use this unweighted adjacency matrix.
In the second set of matrices, we maintained the entries with the original
values representing the volumes of soy traded. With this, we measured stick-
iness on trade flows. The measurements on flows that are equivalent to those
on linkages presented here are shown in the Supplemental Information. Both
measurements, on soy trade linkages and flows, are highly correlated. They
are complementary indicators. While the measurements on linkages allow us
to identify overall changes in the configurations of commercial relationships,
the measurements on flows allow us to qualify these changes by indicating
whether the configuration of volumes traded through each linkage increased
or decreased.
For stickiness in trade linkages (unweighted networks), we used the tempo-
ral correlation coefficient (C)76,103 and its intermediary steps for directed, tem-
poral, and unweighted networks (as adapted by B€uttner et al.104 and Pigott and
Herrera105). These intermediary steps are the topological overlap (Ci), the tem-
poral average topological overlap (TCi), and the graph average topological
overlap (Cm; Equations 1, 2, 3, and 4). Cm is the average topological overlap,
calculated not over time as TCi, but over groups of nodes. It is a necessary step
to see the overall stickiness across groups and to calculate C. For stickiness in
trade flows (weighted networks), we adapted the topological overlap (Ci) to
analyze directed, temporal, and weighted networks, transforming it into
what we call weighted persistence of trade flows (WPi) and the temporal
average weighted persistence (TWPi; Equations 5 and 6).
Metrics Used for Stickiness in Linkages
The temporal correlation coefficient and its intermediary steps were first de-
signed as metrics for undirected and unweighted networks. Further adjust-
ment corrected and adapted the metric for directed networks.77,104,105 The
temporal correlation coefficient ‘‘measures the overall average probability
for an edge to persist across two consecutive snapshots.’’76,77,103 The topo-
logical overlap (Ci) of the surrounding links around a node in two time points
is the first step tomeasure the temporal correlation coefficient (C) of a network.
The Ci allows us to quantify the temporal changes in the configuration of
trading linkages of an actor in the supply chain.
We present the Ci equation below, where Ci is the topological overlap76 of
links around node i. tm is the first snapshot of the temporal network, for
example, the configuration of trade linkages of the soy supply chain in
2003. tm+1 is the second snapshot, in the same example, the configuration
of trade linkages in 2004, the subsequent year with available data. We
used the same metric to compare non-successive years, i.e., comparing
the network configuration in 2003 with that of 2017. aij is a value (1 or 0) in
the adjacency matrix representing the network. With the Ci (Equation 1),
we can observe and measure temporal changes in two snapshots with the
selected time interval, in the trading relationships around any specific actor
in the supply chain.
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The Ci in biannual snapshots allows the changes in the trade linkages
configuration to be observed over two subsequent years around each node,
e.g., 2003–2004, 2004–2005, ., 2016–2017. Based on this, we then
computed the temporal average topological overlap77 of the nodes (TCi, Equa-
tion 2) for all snapshots, whereM is the total number of considered snapshots.
In our study, the maximum snapshots we can have is 15, each year from 2003
to 2017.
TCi =
1
M 1
XM1
m=1
Ciðtm; tm+ 1Þ: (Equation 2)
In practical terms, Equation 1 is calculated over two snapshots that may be
successive years (e.g., 2003–2004) or non-successive years (e.g., 2003–2017),
and Equation 2 is the mean of several Cis over time. Equation 2 shows the
average variation in stickiness for every node in the complete length of the
analyzed period and considering all biannual changes in between. With this
Ci temporal average (TCi), we can see the average changes in the trading re-
lationships around any specific actor or region over a longer period, acknowl-
edging several or all subsequent snapshots in between.
In the third step, we grouped the trade relationships in six types: logistics
hubs (LHs) supplying (A) traders and (B) countries; (C) traders sourcing from
LHs, and (D) supplying countries; (E) countries sourcing from traders, and (F)
from LHs (Figure 2). We then calculated the mean of the biannual Cis for each
type of relationship. Having the Cis of nodes, we also calculated the average
topological overlap of the graph (entire supply network)104 for two consecu-
tive snapshots (Cm, Equation 3). The Cm is different from Ci temporal
average because TCi focuses on the trade linkages configuration around
each node, while Cm describes the changes in the whole network configura-
tion. The Cm is an intermediary step to get to the temporal correlation coef-
ficient (C). Therefore, we did not present the results here. The equation
used is
Cm =
1
max½AðtmÞ;Aðtm+ 1Þ
XN
i = 1
Ciðtm; tm+ 1Þ: (Equation 3)
In this equation, max[A(tm),A(tm+1)] denotes themaximum number of active
nodes of the graph at tm and tm+1. A node i is called ‘‘active’’ at time tm if it has
an edge with any other node.77 This equation was presented by B€uttner
et al.104 and Pigott and Herrera,105 modifying Nicosia et al. s76 equation to
acknowledge only active nodes in the calculation rather than all nodes,
i.e., even inactive nodes that did not trade anything in the two snapshots
considered. We subset the network to compute Cm for specific groups of
edges or, in our case, trade relationships, as described above.
Finally, the temporal correlation coefficient (C) (Equation 4) measures the
overall average probability of an edge to persist between two consecutive
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snapshots.76,77,103 It is the fourth step after computing Ci andCm.M is the total
number of considered snapshots. C is calculated as follows:
C =
1
M 1
XM1
m= 1
Cm: (Equation 4)
The temporal correlation coefficient (Equation 4) summarizes the Cms,
which we grouped by type of supply chain relationship, to demonstrate how
much the trade configuration changes overall with the length of the time frame
observed.
All these four metrics generate values ranging from 0 to 1, 0 being a com-
plete change and 1 a complete maintenance of the trade configuration. As
an illustration, if one actor in the supply chain displays Ci or TCi = 1, it means
that this actor kept precisely the same trade linkages configuration throughout
the period assessed. On the contrary, if the value is 0, the trade linkage config-
uration changed utterly. Any value in between implies some degree of recon-
figuration. Looking at Cm and C, 1 means that the whole trade network re-
mained completely unchanged over the assessed period, while 0 means a
complete change. As can be expected, the longer the time interval, the
more likely the network is to change, and therefore the less sticky it appears
(Figure 4). B€uttner et al.77 found a slightly different trend in their pork supply
chain analysis, as C increases sharply in the initial increments of the time
frame, and then starts to fall slowly as time frame increases. Their time steps
were very short (days) compared with ours, so their supply chain appears
much more volatile in comparison with our soy supply chain, which is less vol-
atile and measured in years.
Metrics Used for Stickiness in Flows
Despite the robustness of C and its sequential steps to measure stickiness in
trade relationships, one primary limitation of this metric is its inability to ac-
count for the changes in volumes traded, as it was designed for unweighted
networks (binary set of linkages). The Ci is calculated over a list of binary edges
or pairs of adjacency matrices, where nodes are either connected by a trade
relationship (1) or not (0). For our stickiness analysis of commodity trade, it is
also important to gauge the variations in flows, i.e., the volumes of product
traded in tons over the years through the linkages. Therefore, we devised an
additional index modifying the Ci and C steps. The weighted persistence index
(WPi) is the ratio between the absolute changes in the trade flows of a node i
and the total volume of soy produced or distributed (if the node is a logistic
hub), traded (if it is a trader), or imported (if it is a country) by this node i in
the observed time window. The same interpretation of Ci applies to theWPi in-
dex, i.e., an actor having WPi = 1 reveals that, overall, its inflows or outflows of
commodities remained unchanged over the observed period, whereas 0 indi-
cates a complete change in flows. We calculated the weighted persistence
(WPi, own formulation) as
WPi

tm;tm+ 1

=1
P
j
aijðtmÞ  aijðtm+ 1ÞP
jaijðtmÞ+ aijðtjm+ 1Þ
; (Equation 5)
TWPi =
1
M 1
XM1
m=1
WPiðtm; tm+1Þ: (Equation 6)
With these two equations, we demonstrate a way to measure stickiness and
its three dimensions in commodity trading. Other metrics and approaches
could be used. TheWPi is only applicable to edges or flows aggregated by no-
des or by types of trading relationships.
Measuring the Three Dimensions of Stickiness
Based on these indices, we explored the three dimensions of stickiness empir-
ically, using the soy data, through the following questions (Figure 7):
Persistence
Which actors and locations have trade linkages and flows that are persistent
over time? To answer this, we can look at trade linkages and flows with Ci,
TCi, WPi, and TWPi close to 1. Those who kept biannual Cis and WPis at
high values over the whole observed period are the most persistent. Actors
and places that have values for these metrics closer to 0 have low persistence
for the period considered.
Resistance
Which actors and locations have trade linkages and flows that are resistant
over time? To answer this, we need to identify a potential or known shock,
which can, among other things, be a drought, a new trade policy, a ban or mor-
atorium, a sudden increase or decrease in global demand. Once we have iden-
tified a shock, we look at trade linkages and flows that are subject to this shock
and observe how their persistence (as measured by Ci for linkages and byWPi
for flows) performed during the shock period. The trade linkages and flows that
maintained Cis andWPis, respectively, at values that are high and similar to the
period before the shock can be characterized as resistant. Those who experi-
ence a substantial change are less resistant, and thosewho break linkages and
flows and experience a sudden drop in their indices are non-resistant. Note
that proper attribution of the changes in network configuration to the identified
shocks requires applying appropriate causal inference approaches that we did
not do here (Figure 7).
Recovery and Reconfiguration
Which actors and locations have trade linkages and flows that recover and re-
configure a stable situation over time? For this question, we look at linkages
and flows that are affected by a shock, i.e., show decreasingCis andWPis dur-
ing the shock period, but which afterward reconfigured their connections and
flows in a way that they returned to a similar trade configuration as before the
shock. Here, we make two subdivisions. The first entails the recovery toward
the same previous stable configuration, i.e., after breaking linkages and flows,
they recover to the same old partners and stabilize. The second entails link-
ages and flows that recover, but in a new configuration, i.e., they create new
linkages with new partners and then maintain this stable new configuration.
Here, we did not analyze causal explanations of this dimension, only observed
it empirically (Figure 7).
These three dimensions can be illustrated by first identifying a shock and
how the Cis and WPis drop in the period after the shock. If it recovers during
subsequent snapshots, it means the linkages and flows were re-established
in a more stable configuration. If we increase the analyzed time frame, for
example, instead of 2007–2008 we look at Cis and WPis for 2007–2012 and
see unchanged high Cis andWPis, it means that not only were the supply chain
actors able to re-establish stable relations but these relations were similar to
those prior to the shock; i.e., that the network restored to its previous config-
uration. In contrast, if Cis and WPis for 2007–2012 are low, it means that over
this longer period, they changed the configuration significantly, so the network
has reconfigured.
It is essential to highlight that here we do not define numeric boundaries or
thresholds to determine when the stickiness of a trade linkage or flow is resis-
tant or recovering, or not. So far, this is done simply in terms of comparison
with previous patterns. In other words, if the stickiness index of a specific
node varies between, e.g., 0.7 and 0.9 for a period, then it drops to 0.1 in a
biannual timestamp, to go up again back to the 0.7 and 0.9 range, we can point
out its recovery. More empirical analyses and stickiness observations are
needed so that we can start considering the establishment of numeric bound-
aries and thresholds for each dimension.
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